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THE AMERICAN INJUSTICE SYSTEM: THE INHERENT 
CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN POLICE-PROSECUTOR 
RELATIONSHIPS & HOW IMMUNITY LETS THEM ‘GET 
AWAY WITH MURDER’ 
ALEXANDRA HODSON* 
ABSTRACT 
There is an inherent conflict of interest in the American justice system aris-
ing out of the intimate police-prosecutor relationship that has evolved in 
the United States over the last forty years. While police and prosecutors 
formerly operated as independent units, a concerted effort to join forces 
has resulted in close working relationships. These relationships have in-
creasingly led law enforcement to employ perjury and unethical tactics to 
obtain unjust convictions against criminal defendants. In addition, they 
have allowed law enforcement to commit atrocious acts without fear of 
punishment. And, because police and prosecutors enjoy immunity under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 for almost any conduct, victims and their families are often 
left without recourse in either a criminal or civil forum—even when law en-
forcement officials commit criminal, malicious, or bad faith acts against 
them. 
But there is hope yet. This Comment proposes a larger degree of separation 
between officers and prosecutors. It also proposes that law enforcement 
officials be held accountable for purposefully failing to report each other’s 
misconduct and criminal acts. Finally, it suggests that immunity doctrines 
should be limited to exclude malicious and bad faith acts. These modifica-
tions will result in a more trustworthy and predictable criminal justice sys-
tem—one that stifles the insidious behavior that leads to unjust criminal 
convictions, and provides § 1983 plaintiffs a better chance at recovery 
when law enforcement officials violate their rights. 
Human progress is neither automatic nor inevitable . . . 
Every step toward the goal of justice requires 
sacrifice, suffering, and struggle; 
the tireless exertions and passionate concern 
of dedicated individuals.1 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Officer-prosecutor relationships embody an inherent conflict of interest in the 
American justice system. This conflict is most evident when prosecutors and officers 
tag-team to obtain unjust convictions against criminal defendants, and when those 
in law enforcement walk away from criminal charges or civil liability for even the 
most egregious unlawful acts or constitutional deprivations. These injustices are 
possible because prosecutorial decisions to bring criminal charges are entirely dis-
cretionary and because immunity doctrines render § 1983 civil actions largely un-
successful. In addition, law enforcement misconduct is all but translucent. These 
aspects of our justice system leave victims and their families without recourse for 
the wrongs committed against them. 
This Comment argues that if prosecutors and officers operated on a more sep-
arate basis, if they were held accountable for their unlawful and unethical actions, 
and if immunity doctrines were limited to exclude malicious and bad faith acts, our 
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justice system would take a giant leap toward living up to its maxim of “Equal Justice 
Under [the] Law.”2 
Part II of this Comment will introduce 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the private right of 
action it created to hold state actors civilly liable when they violate a person’s rights 
under the Constitution or a federal statute. It will discuss the doctrines of absolute 
and qualified immunity as a defense for officers, prosecutors, and judges in a § 1983 
lawsuit. And, it will illustrate how these immunities are overly broad, leading to in-
justice for § 1983 plaintiffs. Part III will discuss the conflict of interest inherent in 
the prosecutor-officer relationship, provide concrete examples of the repercussions 
of our current system, and discuss how the wide net cast by immunities fosters law 
enforcement misconduct. Part IV will conclude this Comment by advocating for lim-
iting the relationship between officers and prosecutors, appointing independent 
prosecutors to investigate and prosecute law enforcement, and limiting the immun-
ity doctrines to exclude protection for malicious or bad faith acts. 
II. HISTORY OF § 1983 AND COMMON LAW IMMUNITIES 
By enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”), Congress created a private right of 
action for an individual to bring a claim against a state actor who, under color of 
law, deprives the individual of rights secured by the Constitution or a federal law.3 
In sum, the statute allows a person to obtain damages or an injunction against a 
state actor who violates that person’s individual or federal rights.4 However, the 
statute “is not itself a source of substantive rights.”5 Instead, it provides “a method 
for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.”6 As the Supreme Court noted in 
Monroe v. Pape, § 1983’s “purpose is plain from the title of the legislation, ‘[a]n Act 
to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States[.]’”7 
However, the Supreme Court has since established that the common law doc-
trines of absolute and qualified immunity are affirmative defenses to a § 1983 ac-
tion.8 These different immunities may protect a judge, a prosecutor, or a police of-
ficer from having to pay damages to the injured plaintiff when acting under color of 
law in violating that plaintiff’s rights.9 This Section discusses the history of § 1983 
and the judicially created doctrines of absolute and qualified immunity. It then ad-
                                                                
 2. Quote engraved on the front of the United States Supreme Court building. 
 3. 42 U.S.C § 1983 (2012).  
 4. Id.  
 5. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979).  
 6. Id.  
 7. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. 
of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).  
 8. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 23941 (1974); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 
43435 (1976); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 342 (1983). 
 9. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 23738.  
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dresses the ramifications of these immunities for civil plaintiffs and criminal defend-
ants. It concludes with an argument for limiting immunity to exclude bad faith and 
malicious actions. 
A. Providing a Remedy for Constitutional Deprivations: The History of § 1983 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 states: 
Every person who, under color of any statute . . . subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress . . . .10 
Section 1983 arose as a mechanism to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.11 The states adopted this post-Civil War Amend-
ment primarily to shield individuals from the egregious racial discrimination occur-
ring predominantly in the South.12 However, it was also implemented to protect 
citizens from state interference with individual rights, generally.13 The Fourteenth 
Amendment applies only to the states and provides for due process and equal pro-
tection of the laws (among other constitutional safeguards incorporated against the 
states).14 Section 5 of this Amendment expressly provides Congress with the power 
to pass legislation to enforce the Amendment.15 In1871, Congress did so by enacting 
what is commonly known as the Ku Klux Klan Act (Act).16 
Among several other statutes, § 1983 has its origins in this Act.17 “The scope 
of section 1983 is as broad as the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment itself, which 
includes not only the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses but also . . . many 
of the provisions of the Bill of Rights.”18 Consequently, a plaintiff can employ § 1983 
to enforce federal rights expressly enumerated in the Fourteenth Amendment it-
self, as well as other rights that have been incorporated through the Amendment.19 
The statute is also a mechanism to enforce rights created by federal statutes.20 
                                                                
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).  
 11. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171.  
 12. Id. at 171175. 
 13. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
holding modified by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Bush 
v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1–4; see also Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Con-
stitution, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1052 (2011).  
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.  
 16. See Steven F. Shatz, The Second Death of 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3): The Use and Misuse of 
History in Statutory Interpretation, 27 B.C. L. REV. 911, 913914 (1986). 
 17. Id. at 914. 
 18. S. Nahmod, A Section 1983 Primer (1): History, Purposes and Scope, NAHMOD L. (Oct. 29, 
2009), https://nahmodlaw.com/2009/10/29/a-section-1983-primer-1-history-purposes-and-scope/. 
 19.  Id.   
 20. See OFFICE OF STAFF ATTORNEYS, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, SECTION 1983 OUTLINE 
16 (2015), http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/uploads/guides/section_1983/Section_1983_Out-
line_nolinks.pdf [hereinafter SECTION 1983 OUTLINE]. 
 
2018 THE AMERICAN INJUSTICE SYSTEM: THE INHERENT CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST IN POLICE-PROSECUTOR RELATIONSHIPS & HOW IMMUNITY 
LETS THEM ‘GET AWAY WITH MURDER’ 
567 
 
By its express language, § 1983 allows a plaintiff to bring a suit against every 
person who, while acting under color of state law, violates that person’s individual 
right(s).21 A prima facie case under the statute is established when a plaintiff alleges 
that: (1) a person committed the act under color of state law, and “(2) the action is 
a deprivation of a constitutional right or a federal statutory right.”22 For example, 
“whenever a state or local law enforcement officer makes an arrest, conducts a 
search[,] or uses force in alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment, section 1983 
is potentially implicated.”23 
While it may at first blush seem like this would be a straightforward process, 
it is far more perplexing than it appears. A prime example of the complexity of § 
1983 revolves around its phrase, “every person.”24 In fact, every person under the 
statute does not mean literally every person,25 and it is not an intuitive process to 
determine what this phrase actually entails. Over the years, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the phrase to include obvious persons: “state and local government of-
ficials” (e.g., state judges, prosecutors, and officers), as well as not-so-obvious per-
sons: “local governments” themselves (i.e., municipalities).26 “Every person” ex-
cludes private citizens entirely because private citizens generally do not act “under 
color of state law”.27 And while federal officials are generally excluded from the 
purview of the statute, they may also fall within the ambit of “every person” if they 
act in concert with state officials to deprive a person of a federal right.28 
There are further confusing caveats within the category of “state officials.” For 
example, state officials who are sued in their official capacity for damages are not 
persons under § 1983,29 while those sued in an official capacity for an injunction are 
persons under the statute.30 However, state officials sued in an individual capacity 
for either damages or an injunction are persons under the statute.31 To further be-
fuddle plaintiffs, determining whether a person is a state official to begin with is 
difficult because “[a]n official may be a state official for some purposes and a local 
                                                                
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).  
 22. See id.; KAREN M. BLUM & KATHRYN R. URBONYA, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 4 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 1998) 
[hereinafter BLUM & URBONYA]. 
 23. Nahmod, supra note 18.   
  24.  See id. 
 25. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 34041 (1997).  
 26. See id.; Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In a subsequent case, 
the Supreme Court enumerated four elements to establish municipal liability: “(1) that [the plaintiff] pos-
sessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this 
policy ‘amounts to deliberate indifference’ to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the 
‘moving force behind the constitutional violation.’” Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389–91 (1989). 
 27. See SECTION 1983 OUTLINE, supra note 20, at 12.   
 28. Id. at 15. There is also a federal counterpart to § 1983 that addresses individual right viola-
tions by federal actors. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).  
 29. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69 n.24 (1997); Hafer v. Melo, 502 
U.S. 21, 27 (1991); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).  
 30. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10. 
 31. See SECTION 1983 OUTLINE, supra note 20, at 10. 
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government official for others.”32 The effect of this scheme is that an individual 
wishing to bring a § 1983 action will undoubtedly need the help of a lawyer to even 
have the prospect of understanding what the Statute requires. 
Additional uncertainty arises in the context of employing § 1983 as a remedy 
when a state actor has violated rights provided under a federal statute.33 To suc-
ceed, the statute must give rise to a federal right, must create a private right of 
action, and must not foreclose a § 1983 remedy.34 To determine whether a statute 
gives rise to a federal right, the court considers three questions: (1) Did Congress 
intend that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff?; (2) Did the plaintiff 
“demonstrate that the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so ‘vague and 
amorphous’ that its enforcement would strain judicial competence”?; and (3) Does 
the statute “unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States”? (i.e., is the 
provision giving rise to the asserted right “couched in mandatory rather than prec-
atory terms”?).35 Only if the court answers all three of these questions affirmatively 
will the statute be deemed to give rise to a federal right.36 
If the statute does provide a federal right, a court will look to whether Con-
gress foreclosed a § 1983 remedy for the particular statute.37 Whether a statute 
itself contains “an express, private means of redress” is key to determining congres-
sional intent, and “the existence of a more restrictive private remedy for statutory 
violations has been the dividing line between those cases in which . . . an action 
would lie under § 1983, and those . . . that it would not.”38 “Where statutes contain 
provisions for criminal penalties, citizen suits, judicial review, or even administrative 
proceedings alone, the Supreme Court has found” that a § 1983 cause of action is 
foreclosed.39 
The Supreme Court in Blessing v. Freestone proffered a somewhat ambiguous 
rule for determining whether Congress foreclosed a § 1983 remedy for violation of 
a particular statute: 
Even if a plaintiff demonstrates that a federal statute creates an indi-
vidual right, there is only a rebuttable presumption that the right is en-
forceable under § 1983. Because our inquiry focuses on congressional in-
tent, dismissal is proper if Congress “specifically foreclosed a remedy un-
der § 1983.” Congress may do so expressly, by forbidding recourse to § 
1983 in the statute itself, or impliedly, by creating a comprehensive en-
forcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under 
§ 1983.40 
                                                                
 32. BLUM & URBONYA, supra note 22, at 53 (referencing McMillian v. Monroe Cty., 520 U.S. 781 
(1997)).  
 33. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997).  
 34. See id.; Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1005 (1984). 
 35. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340–41; see also SECTION 1983 OUTLINE, supra note 20, at 16.  
 36. See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340.  
 37. Id. at 341. 
 38. Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 121 (2005).  
 39. SECTION 1983 OUTLINE, supra note 20, at 16 (citing Abrams, 544 U.S. at 121–22).  
 40. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341 (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1005 n.9 (1984)).  
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Whether a “comprehensive enforcement scheme” is incompatible with § 1983 is 
left up to the court to decide.41 In sum, it is incredibly difficult not only to discern 
whom a § 1983 action may be brought against, but also what federal laws § 1983 is 
compatible with. 
And yet another common reason an individual who brings a § 1983 action may 
face difficulty obtaining relief is because the Supreme Court adopted “a plethora of 
defenses called ‘immunities’” that protect individual state and local government of-
ficials from liability for damages.42 The various immunities are discussed below. 
B. Immunity: Taking the Wind Out of § 1983’s Sails 
Almost one hundred years after § 1983 was enacted, the Supreme Court, in a 
series of decisions, determined that the common law defenses of qualified and ab-
solute immunity apply in § 1983 actions.43 These immunities act as a figurative get-
out-of-jail-free card for some state employees acting in their official capacities, such 
as judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement officers.44 Absolute and qualified im-
munity are affirmative defenses in a § 1983 action that preclude state officials from 
being held liable for damages incurred by a plaintiff, even though the official may 
have violated that person’s rights under the Constitution or a federal statute.45 In 
endorsing these immunities, the Court was concerned with policy considerations 
that promote officials being comfortable doing their jobs.46 These policy considera-
tions were laid out by the Supreme Court in Scheuer v. Rhodes: 
[T]he public interest requires decisions and action to enforce laws for the 
protection of the public . . . . Public officials, whether governors, mayors or 
police, legislators or judges, who fail to make decisions when they are 
needed or who do not act to implement decisions when they are made do 
not fully and faithfully perform the duties of their offices. Implicit in the 
idea that officials have some immunity—absolute or qualified—for their 
acts, is a recognition that they may err. The concept of immunity assumes 
this and goes on to assume that it is better to risk some error and possible 
injury from such error than not to decide or act at all.47 
                                                                
 41. Id.  
 42. See Nahmod, supra note 18. 
 43. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 24549 (1974); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 
43235 (1976); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 35456 (1983). Section 1983 was enacted in 1871 as the Ku 
Klux Klan Act to suppress Klan activity in the South after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 
Eric John Nies, Article, The Fiery Cross: Virginia v. Black, History, and the First Amendment, 50 S.D. L. REV. 
182, 197 (2004).  
 44. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 241.  
 45. Id. at 242. 
 46. Id. at 241–42.  
 47. Id.  
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This “error” occasionally occurs in the form of malicious or bad faith acts. But, 
as the Court pointed out in Scheuer, even intentional harm will never by itself pre-
clude a defense of immunity.48 This is because a court does not focus on the indi-
vidual act at hand when addressing whether immunity applies.49 Instead, the im-
munity inquiry is focused on the government function being performed and on the 
specific official’s job responsibilities.50 
While discussing immunity, the Court in Scheuer v. Rhodes also reasoned that 
there were two specific rationales for applying it at common law: “(1) the injustice, 
particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability an officer who is 
required . . . to exercise discretion; [and] (2) the danger that the threat of such lia-
bility would deter his willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness and the 
judgment required” for the good of the public.51 And, although common law im-
munity clearly included a good faith requirement and did not extend to malicious 
or bad faith acts,52 in extending immunity to § 1983 actions, the Court abandoned 
the good faith requirement entirely in favor of an objective reasonable person 
standard.53 
The cost of this overly-broad application of immunity is an immeasurable in-
justice to victims of malicious and bad faith acts. And the stated public policy argu-
ments for extending immunity in this way do not hold up when it comes to protect-
ing state actors from liability at the expense of injured individuals. These immunities 
and their ramifications are discussed further below. 
C. Judicial Immunity & Ramifications 
Although judges are not the focus of this Comment, they are integral to the 
criminal justice system and the process by which unjust convictions are possible. 
Thus, a discussion of judicial immunity is appropriate. Judges enjoy absolute im-
munity while acting in their official capacity and qualified immunity while acting in 
an administrative capacity.54 Official capacities of judges are defined as “judicial acts 
taken within the jurisdiction of their courts.”55 A string of Supreme Court prece-
dents establish that “generally, a judge is immune from a suit for money dam-
ages.”56 Judges also enjoy immunity from injunctions, except in rare circumstances; 
§ 1983 specifically provides that, “in any action brought against a judicial officer for 
an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not 
                                                                
 48. Id. at 242. 
 49. Id. at 241–42. 
 50. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002); Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54–55 (1998); 
Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 201–02 (1985). 
 51. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 240 (emphasis added).  
 52. See Dinsman v. Wilkes, 53 U.S. 390, 402 (1851). 
 53. See Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 365 (2012). 
 54. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 35557 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423–24 
(1976). 
 55. Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); see also Mireles v. 
Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (per curiam).  
 56. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9. 
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be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was una-
vailable.”57 While it has been proposed that “[t]he remedy for judicial errors is an 
appeal, not a § 1983 lawsuit for damages,”58 this proposition does not consider that 
an appeal is only desirable if the outcome of a case is not in the injured individual’s 
favor. Thus, when a judge violates a person’s individual rights, but the case ulti-
mately comes out in that person’s favor, an appeal is useless for remedying the 
judge’s wrong. 
It has been said that “[a] seemingly impregnable fortress in American Juris-
prudence is the absolute immunity of judges from civil liability for acts done by 
them within their judicial jurisdiction.”59 Even when judges act maliciously, cor-
ruptly, or in error, they retain absolute immunity.60 A judge may assert absolute 
immunity unless she “acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction or performs an act 
that is not judicial in nature.”61 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
“[a]lthough unfairness and injustice to a litigant may result . . . ‘it is a general prin-
ciple of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial 
officer . . . shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of 
personal consequences.’”62 Thus, judicial immunity, like all others under § 1983, “is 
not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice[.]”63 The Supreme Court has in-
terestingly opined that even though this immunity will protect an unscrupulous 
judge, it “is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for 
the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to 
exercise their functions with independence . . . .”64 
The Supreme Court case Mireles v. Waco offers a prime example of the egre-
gious behavior that judicial immunity may condone. In that case, Judge Mireles of 
the California Superior Court ordered two police officers at the courthouse to “‘for-
cibly and with excessive force seize and bring plaintiff into his courtroom.’”65 The 
officers using “unreasonable force and violence seize[d] plaintiff [a public defender] 
and remove[d] him backwards” out of a different courtroom where he was ex-
pected to appear.66 They then “‘slammed’ him through the doors” into Judge Mire-
les's courtroom.67 Mr. Waco sued the judge for damages.68 Even though the Su-
preme Court acknowledged that the judge “knowingly and deliberately approved 
                                                                
 57. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 58. BLUM & URBONYA, supra note 22, at 74. 
 59. Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 62 (9th Cir. 1974).  
 60. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11; Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978); Meek v. Cty. 
of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1999).  
 61. Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (internal citations 
omitted); see also Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12.  
 62. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 10 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871)).  
 63. Id. at 11.  
 64. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–19 
(1982) (stating that allegations of malice are insufficient to overcome qualified immunity). 
 65. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 10. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. 
 68. Id.  
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and ratified” the actions of the police officers, Mr. Waco was denied relief because 
the judge was entitled to absolute immunity.69 Although it does not seem that such 
conduct would fall into the category of a judicial function, the Court reasoned that 
Judge Mireles was eligible for absolute immunity because “[a] judge’s direction to 
court officers to bring a person who is in the courthouse before him is a function 
normally performed by a judge.”70 
Another example of injustice resulting from the application of absolute im-
munity is evidenced in the Supreme Court case, Stump v. Sparkman.71 The issue in 
Stump was whether a circuit court judge was absolutely immune from suit when he 
authorized sterilization of a “somewhat retarded” fifteen-year-old girl.72 The judge 
approved the petition instituted by the girl’s mother the same day he received it “in 
an ex parte proceeding without notice to the minor, without a hearing, and without 
the appointment of a guardian ad litem.”73 Six days later, the girl was sterilized un-
der the belief that she was just having her appendix removed.74 It was not until she 
was married and trying to have children that she found out about the court order 
and sterilization procedure.75 At that time, she brought a suit against the judge for 
violating her constitutional rights.76 
The U.S. District Court found that the judge had absolute immunity because 
“whether or not Judge Stump's ‘approval’ of the petition may in retrospect appear 
to have been premised on an erroneous view of the law, [he] surely had jurisdiction 
to consider the petition and to act thereon.”77 The Seventh Circuit reversed on ap-
peal holding that the judge had not acted within his jurisdiction and failed to comply 
with “elementary principles of procedural due process.”78 But, the United States 
Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, reasoning that judges are “absolutely 
immune from monetary liability ‘for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in 
excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or cor-
ruptly.’”79 Because the inquiry into the judge’s actions is halted once immunity is 
deemed to apply, even a judge who truly acts maliciously or corruptly will not be 
questioned for her actions. 
As a result, absolute immunity effectively excuses a judge’s behavior when he 
commits not just an innocent mistake, but also an intentional malicious or bad faith 
act as long as the reviewing court decides the action was one normally performed 
by a judge. 
                                                                
 69. Id. at 1011. 
 70. Id. at 12.  
 71. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).  
 72. Id. at 351.  
 73. Id. at 360.  
 74. Id. at 353.  
 75. Id.  
 76. Id.  
 77. Stump, 435 U.S. at 354–55.  
 78. Id. at 355. 
 79. Id. at 364–65 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 336 (1871).  
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D. Prosecutorial Immunity & Ramifications 
Prosecutors also enjoy absolute immunity while acting in their official capaci-
ties and qualified immunity when they are acting in an administrative capacity.80 
“[P]rosecutors are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for their conduct 
in ‘initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case,’ insofar as that con-
duct is ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process[.]’”81 
“The test . . . for determining the scope of immunity to be afforded for particular 
prosecutorial activities is a functional one: there is absolute immunity for quasi-ju-
dicial functions, but only qualified immunity for administrative or investigative func-
tions.”82 There are several factors to consider in determining which function a pros-
ecutor’s act falls under.83 If the act is “primarily concerned with the prosecutor’s 
role as an advocate”; has a close temporal and physical relationship to the judicial 
process; and “depends upon legal opinions and/or discretionary judgments,” it is 
likely quasi-judicial and entitled to absolute immunity.84 
Akin to judicial immunity, prosecutorial immunity is based on public policy 
considerations. The Supreme Court first applied this principle of prosecutorial im-
munity under § 1983 in its 1976 decision, Imbler v. Pachtman: 
The common-law immunity of a prosecutor is based upon the same con-
siderations that underlie the common-law immunities of judges . . . acting 
within the scope of their duties. These include concern that harassment by 
unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of the prosecutor's energies 
from his public duties, and the possibility that he would shade his decisions 
instead of exercising the independence of judgment required by his public 
trust.85 
The Court in Imbler noted: “To be sure, this immunity does leave the genuinely 
wronged defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or 
dishonest action deprives him of liberty. But the alternative of qualifying a prosecu-
tor’s immunity would disserve the broader public interest.”86 As evidenced by the 
Imbler opinion, the Court blatantly favored prosecutors’ welfare over that of crimi-
nal defendants in creating this immunity. 
The illustrious Judge Learned Hand also endorsed this view on prosecutorial 
immunity while acknowledging the injustice that may be wrought from it.87 His 
                                                                
 80. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423–24 (1976); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 
231(2009).  
 81. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991) (citations omitted) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431).  
 82. Wilkinson v. Ellis, 484 F. Supp. 1072, 1080 (E.D. Pa. 1980).  
 83. Id. at 108081. 
 84. Id. at 1081. 
 85. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 422–23 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). It stands to reason 
that the court could dispose of unfounded litigation quickly by simply dismissing patently frivolous cases. 
Thus, there would be no need to invoke absolute immunity in those instances, and founded litigation could 
go forward.  
 86. Id. at 427 (referencing Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 
U.S. 949 (1950)). 
 87. See generally Gregoire, 177 F.2d 579. 
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opinion in Gregoire v. Biddle discusses the reasoning for dismissing a § 1983 suit 
outright on account of an immunity defense: 
[A]n official, who is in fact guilty of . . . any other personal motive not con-
nected with the public good, should not escape liability for the injuries he 
may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such complaints 
to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The justification for 
doing so is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded 
until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent 
as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger 
of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or 
the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties. Again 
and again the public interest calls for action which may turn out to be 
founded on a mistake, in the face of which an official may later find himself 
hard put to it to satisfy a jury of his good faith. There must indeed be means 
of punishing public officers who have been truant to their duties; but that 
is quite another matter.88 
He went on to state that “it has been thought in the end better to leave unre-
dressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do 
their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.”89 But the risk of denying valuable 
relief to plaintiffs who assert founded claims against prosecutors far outweighs the 
benefit of protecting officials from unfounded lawsuits. This ability for prosecutors 
to essentially ‘get away with murder’ fosters distrust in the criminal justice system. 
And although there are other methods of punishing prosecutors who commit mis-
conduct, they are constrained to either criminal prosecution or professional disci-
pline,90 neither of which provide relief to the actual victim of the prosecutor’s 
wrongdoing. 
Further, uncertainty looms in determining which actions qualify for absolute 
immunity. One case that exemplifies this uncertainty is the Sixth Circuit case, Rouse 
v. Stacy.91 In March, 2006, Mr. Rouse was indicted for  various criminal acts.92 Mr. 
Rouse alleged that, “while he was incarcerated in the Fulton County Detention Cen-
ter awaiting his . . . trial, [prosecutor] Stacy called the jailer on his cell phone during 
a court hearing and told him that Rouse had not pled guilty. . . .”93 He then in-
structed the jailer to “do it tonight.”94 The prosecutor was irritated that Mr. Rouse 
had not pled guilty, and so he ordered violence: 
                                                                
 88. Id. at 581. 
 89. Id.  
 90. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976); see also BLUM & URBONYA, supra note 22, 
at 76. (“The remedies of professional self- discipline and the criminal law serve as checks to the broad dis-
cretion of prosecutors.”). 
 91. Rouse v. Stacy, 478 F. App’x 945 (6th Cir. 2012). Although this is an unpublished opinion, it is 
not serving as precedent, but is used to exemplify the kind of reproachful behavior that prosecutors may 
believe immunity applies to, and the confusion even within the court about the standard for applying im-
munity. 
 92. Id. at 946.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id.  
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Around 2:00 a.m. the following morning, the jailer and two detention 
guards allegedly entered Rouse's cell, smothered him with a pillow, 
“busted his face” against an intercom, and choked him with a string. While 
walking out of Rouse's cell, the jailer told Rouse that next time he should 
plead guilty.  
During the first day of trial, Rouse changed his plea to guilty as part 
of a plea agreement with [prosecutor] Stacy.95 
Prior to sentencing, Mr. Rouse moved to withdraw his guilty plea, but the 
court denied his motion.96 Thereafter, he was sentenced to twenty-seven years in 
prison.97 Mr. Rouse initiated a § 1983 action against the prosecutor and the police 
officers for using excessive force against him.98 In response to the allegations, the 
prosecutor said that his conduct was part of “negotiating a plea agreement[,]”99 and 
he asserted that he was simply “performing a prosecutorial function in seeking to 
induce Mr. Rouse to plead guilty to the charges against him.”100 He also argued that, 
“[b]ecause plea bargaining [wa]s a ’quasi-judicial’ function,” he was absolutely im-
mune from suit, “however ‘illegal and reprehensible’” his actions may have been.101 
The court rejected this defense and stated that his actions were “entirely outside 
the scope of the duties of a prosecutor.”102 
The majority’s outcome in Rouse was logical. However, a dissenting judge 
agreed with the prosecutor that he should have been protected by absolute im-
munity, “however egregious” his actions may have been.103 The reasoning? Because 
the beating was in furtherance of a plea bargain, which “falls within the protected 
prosecutorial function . . . .”104 This judge assertedthat the case turned upon the 
purpose of the beating: if it was punishment for not pleading guilty the first time, 
then the prosecutor was not immune.105 But, if the beating was to induce Mr. Rouse 
to plead guilty in the future, then the prosecutor was absolutely immune because 
he would have been “advocating for the State[.]”106 
As evidenced in Rouse, the lack of standards governing prosecutorial conduct 
that will and will not be protected under absolute immunity is damaging to both § 
                                                                
 95. Id.  
 96. Id.  
 97. Rouse, 478 F. App’x at 946.  
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 950.  
 100. Id. at 953.  
 101. Id. at 950. 
 102. Id.   
 103. Rouse, 478 F. App’x at 956. (McKeague, J., dissenting).  
 104. Id.   
 105. Id. at 960 (“Rouse . . . alleged that Stacy ordered the beating for the purpose of inducing him 
to plead guilty, which begins and ends his case.”). 
 106. Id. This dissenter opined that “the proper question is whether alleged misconduct was re-
lated to a prosecutorial function—i.e., was the prosecutor, regardless of the egregiousness of the act, ad-
vocating for the State?” Id.  
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1983 plaintiffs and prosecutors alike.107 Without clear boundaries, both sides of a § 
1983 suit are left unable to predict whether immunity will apply. 
In sum, the prosecutorial immunity announced in Imbler has gone too far and 
simultaneously not far enough.108 The Court should both limit absolute prosecuto-
rial immunity to exclude bad faith and malicious acts while clearly delineating when 
a prosecutor will be liable for her conduct under the Imbler standard. 
E. Police Immunity & Ramifications 
Police officers also enjoy either qualified or absolute immunity, depending on 
the context. In Pierson v. Ray, the Supreme Court established that police officers 
have qualified immunity while acting in their official capacities as long as they do 
not violate a clearly established right.109 In Briscoe v. LaHue and Rehberg v. Paulk, 
the Court established that officers have absolute immunity while acting as wit-
nesses in a criminal trial or before a grand jury.110 As discussed herein, these im-
munities have the potential to inflict enormous harm to civil plaintiffs and criminal 
defendants alike. 
i. Police Acting as Police: Qualified Immunity 
The case Monroe v. Pape opened the door for § 1983 damage suits against 
officers acting in their official capacities.111 Typical § 1983 actions that are brought 
against officers acting in their official capacities are: excessive force, unlawful arrest 
and imprisonment, illegal search and seizure, deprivation of medical attention, in-
action when there is a duty to act, and coercion or illegal interrogation.112 But, be-
cause § 1983 is merely a mechanism for vindicating federal rights, police abuses 
that do not violate either a federal law or a specific constitutional provision, “no 
matter how objectionable or egregious, are not cognizable under [§ 1983].”113 
Whereas Monroe seemed to provide an avenue for § 1983 plaintiffs to gain 
relief against officers, Harlow v. Fitzgerald reined Monroe in by establishing that 
officers are entitled to qualified immunity while acting in their official capacities.114 
Qualified immunity shields an officer not merely from paying damages but from lit-
igation altogether when a plaintiff brings a § 1983 action.115 The Harlow Court prof-
fered a method for determining when qualified immunity will apply; “[G]overnment 
officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for 
                                                                
 107. See generally id. 
 108. See Bennett L. Gershman, Bad Faith Exception to Prosecutorial Immunity for Brady Violations, 
HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. (2010), http://harvardcrcl.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Gersh-
man_Publish.pdf.  
 109. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).  
 110. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 33537 (1983); Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 368 (2012). 
 111. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Services, 
436 U.S. 658 (1978).  
 112. Matthew V. Hess, Comment, Good Cop-Bad Cop: Reassessing the Legal Remedies for Police 
Misconduct, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 149, 157–58 (1993).  
 113. Id. at 158.   
 114. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 115. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).  
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civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory 
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”116 Thus, 
officers are not liable for damages while acting under color of state law if they rea-
sonably could have thought at the time they acted that their actions were “con-
sistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.”117 This immunity is con-
sidered “qualified” because it kicks in only after a separate condition is satisfied ,i.e., 
the officer’s conduct must be deemed to not violate a clearly established right.118 
But whether an officer is acting under color of state law and whether a right is 
“clearly established” are not so clear.119 
In White v. Pauly, the Supreme Court stated that while a previous court case 
does not have to be directly on point to prove that a right is clearly established, 
“existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question be-
yond debate.”120 That premise appears to be fairly straightforward, but the Court 
has created muddled precedent in favor of qualified immunity, even when the right 
was clearly established at the time of the action, but the action itself was not yet 
clearly recognized as a violation of that right.121 For example, in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 
the Court held that an official was entitled to qualified immunity for authorizing an 
unconstitutional wiretap because “it was not clearly established” that such a wire-
tap violated the Fourth Amendment.122 This reasoning permits an official to take a 
novel action (e.g., wiretapping) that even she may even believe is in violation of a 
clearly established right, and still have no liability to a § 1983 plaintiff simply be-
cause she committed a new type of constitutional violation.123 In effect, this means 
that until a court creates binding precedent that this particular action is a clear vio-
lation of that right—which may be years later, if ever—the officer can repeat the 
act with immunity, even when she believes that she is violating a person’s rights. In 
essence, the Court has contributed murky principles to the “clearly established” in-
quiry. 
                                                                
 116. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.  
 117. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987). 
 118. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.  
 119. Though the Supreme Court has attempted to clarify the scope and meaning of qualified im-
munity, it has acknowledged the continuing confusion surrounding its applicability. See White v. Pauly, 137 
S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017). In White v. Pauly, the Court highlighted the fact that from 2012–2017, it granted 
certiorari and issued “a number of opinions reversing federal courts in qualified immunity cases.” Id.  
 120. Id. (internal citation omitted). The purpose of this standard is to give officers and other offi-
cials “breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments . . . .” City & Cty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 135 
S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015). 
 121. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).  
 122. Id. at 53034. 
 123. Because the court applies a reasonable person standard to immunity, as opposed to a good 
faith standard, the court would never delve into the subjective knowledge of the officer in this example to 
determine if immunity applies. Although it is arguable that reasonable people do not act maliciously, the 
Supreme Court has rejected the proposition that maliciousness equates to objective unreasonableness, at 
least in the Fourth Amendment context: “Whatever the empirical correlations between ‘malicious and sa-
distic’ behavior and objective unreasonableness may be . . . the ‘malicious and sadistic’ factor puts in issue 
the subjective motivations of the individual officers, which our prior cases make clear has no bearing” on 
unreasonableness. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).  
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An officer is deemed to be acting under color of state law when she is acting 
within the scope of her employment.124 Even when an officer abuses her authority 
or goes outside of her authority, she may still be acting under color of law.125 This 
interpretation is beneficial for plaintiffs because it hinders an officer from evading 
liability for egregious conduct by claiming that her actions do not fall under color of 
law. 
For example, in Johnson v. Phillips, an officer who sexually assaulted a home-
less woman asserted that he could not have violated her constitutional rights be-
cause he was not acting within the scope of his employment when he committed 
the assault.126 While he was on duty, the officer stopped the woman and enticed 
her into following him to an empty parking lot by telling her that he was going to 
provide her with information about homeless shelters.127 He then “pressed his body 
up against [hers] and began making comments about her genitals.”128 At that point, 
he “pulled [her] shorts and underwear to the side, and proceeded to take pictures 
of her genitals” with his cell phone while also “penetrat[ing] her vagina with his 
finger.”129 The court found that he was acting within the scope of his employment 
because he used his position as a police officer to perpetrate these atrocities.130 
Conversely, if an officer does not act within his scope of employment, he acts 
as a private citizen.131 For example, in the Ninth Circuit case Van Ort v. Estate of 
Stanewich, an officer (Stanewich) had searched Mr. Van Ort’s house.132 The day af-
ter the search, the officer returned to the home wearing a mask, bound Mr. Van 
Ort, “placed a pillowcase over his head and doused him with lighter fluid[,]” while 
he “threatened to set him on fire unless he was given the combination to [a] 
safe.”133 The officer also dragged Mr. Van Ort’s grandmother from room to room, 
demanding the safe’s combination.134 In its opinion that Van Ort could not employ 
§ 1983 to obtain relief from Stanewich, the court reasoned that: 
Individuals do, indeed, have a right to be free from state violations of the 
constitutional guarantees to be secure in one's person and home, not to 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process, and to be free 
from cruel and unusual punishment. Individuals, however, have no right to 
be free from the infliction of such harm by private actors.135 
                                                                
 124. See SECTION 1983 OUTLINE, supra note 20, at 12. 
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Even though Stanewich undoubtedly exploited his position as an officer to 
commit this heinous crime—he had just searched the house and at that time pre-
sumably saw the safe that he eventually came back to plunder—the court found no 
state action. 136 
Even when an officer is said to be acting under color of state law, protection 
under qualified immunity means that officers are almost never held liable in a § 
1983 suit. This is because 
[q]ualified immunity is not simply a defense to recovery at trial; it is a sub-
stantial legal barrier to preclude the defendant from undergoing the risk, 
expense, and aggravation of litigation where . . . the actions of the defend-
ant, even if excessive, were within the bounds of any objective reasonable 
judgment.137 
This effectively means that a judge will glaze over the facts of the case to de-
termine whether the official violated a clearly established right while acting under 
color of law, without delving into any of the details.138 And while limited discovery 
may be allowed in some cases as a basis for a Court's determination of whether 
qualified immunity applies, this is the exception and not the rule.139 Thus, unless 
qualified immunity is overcome, an officer will not be subjected to the “aggrava-
tion” of litigation and a plaintiff will not receive the benefit of discovery or a trial.140 
While qualified immunity is a substantial barrier to § 1983 plaintiffs in actions 
against officers, absolute immunity is an insurmountable one. 
ii. Police Acting as Witnesses: Absolute Immunity 
In the highly contested Supreme Court opinion Bristiol v. LaHue, the Court es-
tablished that police witnesses have absolute immunity from actions for damages 
that result from their testimony at trial.141 The court justified its japplication of ab-
solute immunity to police testimony by contending that “[a] witness’s apprehension 
of subsequent damages liability” might cause her to censor her testimony or cause 
her reluctance in coming forward to testify.142 For example, the Court said “[a] wit-
ness who knows that he might be forced to defend a subsequent lawsuit, and per-
haps to pay damages, might be inclined to shade his testimony in favor of the po-
tential plaintiff, to magnify uncertainties, and thus to deprive the finder of fact of 
candid, objective, and undistorted evidence.”143 
                                                                
 136. Van Ort, 92 F.3d at 835. As it turned out, another police officer arrived on the scene to stop 
the crime and shot the intruder (whom he did not realize was Stanewich) twice, killing him. Id. at 834. Hence, 
the “Estate of Stanewich” designation for the defendant in the case.  
 137. Kathleen L. Daerr-Bannon, Cause of Acti`on Under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 for Use of Excessive 
Force by Police in Making Arrest, 59 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 173 (2013) (Sept. 2017 Update).  
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 139. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987). 
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 142. Id. at 333 (internal citations omitted). 
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The plaintiffs in Briscoe provided a plethora of arguments against applying ab-
solute immunity to police witnesses: 
[T]he reasons supporting common-law immunity—the need to avoid in-
timidation and self-censorship—apply with diminished force to police of-
ficers. Policemen often have a duty to testify about the products of their 
investigations, and they have a professional interest in obtaining convic-
tions which would assertedly counterbalance any tendency to shade testi-
mony in favor of potentially vindictive defendants. In addition, they are 
subject to § 1983 lawsuits for the performance of their other duties, as to 
which they have only qualified immunity[.] . . . . Further, petitioners urge 
that perjured testimony by police officers is likely to be more damaging to 
constitutional rights than such testimony by ordinary citizens, because the 
policeman in uniform carries special credibility in the eyes of jurors. And, 
in the case of police officers, who cooperate regularly with prosecutors in 
the enforcement of criminal law, prosecution for perjury is alleged to be 
so unlikely that it is not an effective substitute for civil damages.144 
In response, the court callously stated, “[t]hese contentions have some 
force[,]” but “our cases clearly indicate that immunity analysis rests on functional 
categories, not on the status of the defendant.”145 And “[a] police officer on the 
witness stand performs the same functions as any other witness” who would re-
ceive absolute immunity for her testimony.146 
To further justify its position, the court went on to assert that “other consid-
erations of public policy support absolute immunity more emphatically for [govern-
ment witnesses] than for ordinary witnesses.”147 For example, the Court said, 
“[s]ubjecting government officials, such as police officers, to damages liability under 
§ 1983 for their testimony might undermine not only their contribution to the judi-
cial process but also the effective performance of their other public duties.”148 Fur-
ther, “[t]his category of § 1983 litigation might well impose significant burdens on 
the judicial system and on law enforcement resources.”149 
After thoroughly explaining its position in Briscoe, the Court concluded by stat-
ing: 
In short, the rationale of our prior absolute immunity cases governs 
the disposition of this case. In 1871, common-law immunity for witnesses 
was well settled. The principles set forth in Pierson v. Ray to protect judges 
and in Imbler v. Pachtman to protect prosecutors also apply to witnesses, 
who perform a somewhat different function in the trial process but whose 
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participation in bringing the litigation to a just—or possibly unjust—con-
clusion is equally indispensable.150 
After Briscoe in 1983, officers only had absolute immunity for testimony given 
at trial.151 That is, until 2012 when the Supreme Court decided Rehberg v. Paulk.152 
In Rehberg, the Court extended absolute immunity to officers testifying before a 
grand jury.153 Echoing Briscoe, the court stated that in neither the trial context nor 
the grand jury context is the threat of civil liability necessary to prevent false testi-
mony “because other sanctions—chiefly prosecution for perjury—provide a suffi-
cient deterrent.”154 The Court went on: “Since perjury before a grand jury, like per-
jury at trial, is a serious criminal offense . . . there is no reason to think that this 
deterrent is any less effective in preventing false grand jury testimony.”155 
But in coming to this conclusion in both the trial and grand jury context, the 
Court did not properly consider the relationship between a prosecutor and a testi-
fying officer. While the ordinary witness may have no intimate connection to a pros-
ecutor for which he testifies, the testifying officer often knows and works very 
closely with the prosecutor.156 Indeed, the officer likely worked with the prosecutor 
step-by-step on the very case he is testifying about. This may create an incentive 
for the officer to commit perjury, and for the prosecutor to never call it out. 
In addition, prosecutors themselves enjoy absolute immunity for actions 
taken in their official capacity.157 This includes immunity for decisions about which 
crimes to prosecute.158 The Briscoe and Rehberg Courts failed to acknowledge this 
significant feature of absolute immunity, which provides a prosecutor 100% discre-
tion in deciding who to bring charges against and 0% incentive to charge an officer 
who commits perjury to help obtain a conviction.159 
Another, broader issue that also applies in this context is that an independent 
prosecutor is almost never appointed when an individual alleges that an officer has 
                                                                
 150. Id. at 345–46. Justice Marshall penned a vigorous dissent in that case, stating:  
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committed a crime, such as perjury, against him.160 This creates a clear obstruction 
for the victim—who will prosecute the officer if not theofficer’s colleague, i.e., the 
local prosecutor? Well…nobody. 
In addition, evidence of perjury can be elusive and plaintiffs in § 1983 cases 
do not even have an opportunity to request discovery once absolute immunity is 
deemed to apply.161 Even more perverse is the fact that if a criminal defendant is 
convicted due to perjured police testimony, that individual cannot assert a § 1983 
claim against the officer unless she first has her conviction invalidated—a process 
that is nearly impossible.162 And even if by some miracle she did have the conviction 
invalidated, absolute immunity would still bar her § 1983 claim against the officer 
in that instance because he was acting as a witness.163 
The decisions in both Briscoe and Rehberg have led to unfortunate conse-
quences for victims of police misconduct, especially in light of the police-prosecutor 
relationship. In sum, if given the opportunity, the Court should reconsider its prop-
osition that criminal prosecution is an adequate deterrent to police perjury. 
III. THE HISTORY OF THE POLICE-PROSECUTOR RELATIONSHIP AND RESULTING 
CONFLICT 
A. The Police-Prosecutor Problem 
The “police-prosecutor problem” has been discussed before, but in a much 
different context.164 One in which officers and prosecutors were not cohorts, as 
they are today, but in fact they hardly communicated.165 Prior to the 1980s, police 
and prosecutors were drastically less cooperative with each other than they are 
now, and that resulted in what was previously dubbed the police-prosecutor prob-
lem.166 The lack of collaboration between the two groups was referred to as the 
cooperation gap and was characterized as the “frequent and characteristic want of 
cooperation between the investigating and prosecuting agencies in the same local-
ity.”167 
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The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) proposed various reasons for this coop-
eration gap in its 1989 report on the issue.168 It stated, for example, that “lawyers 
and police officers have different vantage points and thus different perspectives on 
crime. Differences between police and prosecution policies and priorities can make 
coordination difficult.”169 Additionally, “[a] prosecutor is likely to work normal busi-
ness hours but an officer’s hours may vary considerably,” which could make “even 
simple telephone contact difficult.”170 
The NIJ stated that “[c]ase attrition (where an arrest is made but no charge is 
ever filed) [was] one result of poor coordination.”171 And that “[p]oor communica-
tion between the police officer and the prosecutor, for whatever reason, [made] 
the defense attorney's job easier and the prosecutor's job harder.”172 Consequently, 
various jurisdictions across America started a movement during the ’80s to remedy 
the effects of the cooperation gap.173 In one jurisdiction, state law mandated that 
officers and prosecutors work closely together.174 In another, the county created a 
homicide investigation unit wherein “investigators and prosecutors work[ed] in the 
same office and communicate[d] every day about the progress of pending cases.”175 
The NIJ noted that while a task force approach to crime-stopping was not in-
ventive, these new programs were distinguishable for several reasons.176 For in-
stance, these task forces “[did] not go out of existence when one crime [was] solved 
or one group of criminals [was] convicted.”177 Instead, the police officer and the 
prosecutor worked “in physical proximity and ha[d] daily access to one another.”178 
Importantly, the aspect that gave rise to many problems that we see today was that 
“[t]he same investigators work[ed] with the same prosecutors, and vertical prose-
cution [wa]s the general rule.”179  
Vertical prosecution occurs when one prosecutor takes a case from inception 
to appeal.180 “In a vertical structure, prosecutors become familiar with the cases 
                                                                
 168. Id.  
 169. Id.  
 170. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 164, at 1. 
 171. Id.  
 172. Id.  
 173. Id.  
 174. Id. (“Consider the State of Maine. In 1987, the legislature created an entirely new agency, 
the Bureau of Intergovernmental Drug Enforcement, which has reshaped the narcotics investigation-pros-
ecution process. The agency is responsible for ‘the integration and coordination of investigative and prose-
cutorial functions in the State with respect to drug law enforcement.’ This specific language is unprece-
dented. For the first time, a State law mandates that investigators and prosecutors team up to create a 
more efficient and effective drug law enforcement strategy.”)  
 175. Id. at 3. 
 176. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 164, at 5. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. LISA D. WILLIAMS ET AL., SIZING UP THE PROSECUTION: A QUICK GUIDE TO LOCAL PROSECUTION 9 (HARVARD 
COLLEGE, 2010), http://hls.harvard.edu/content/uploads/2008/07/prosecution2010.pdf.  
 
584 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 54 
  
and develop strong working relationships with the witnesses and police officers in-
volved.”181 The intended consequence of this approach was that an officer and pros-
ecutor would develop strong bonds by working together as partners on a case for 
potentially years at a time. 
In the early days, effects of the new officer-prosecutor relationship were pa-
tently positive. “Commitment to cooperation by law enforcement executives and 
individual officers and prosecutors has yielded some impressive beginnings.”182 In 
regard to one jurisdiction’s homicide investigation unit, the NIJ stated: “Of the 24 
murder convictions the unit has succeeded in bringing about since its inception, 
probably fewer than 5 would have been obtained without the team approach.”183 
In its report, the NIJ praised the trailblazing jurisdictions that were beginning to 
pave the path “for investigators and prosecutors to work closely together every step 
of the way, focusing on the same goal—conviction.”184 
But the notion behind promoting these close relationships appears to be 
premised, not on the fact that officers and prosecutors needed to work so closely 
together to obtain convictions, but on the fact that technology was not advanced 
enough to allow them to communicate important information efficiently. In its re-
port, the NIJ noted: 
 Prosecutors benefit in other ways from the close relationship with 
[police] investigators. Up-to-date, in-depth information from a knowledge-
able detective can help the prosecutor's case. For example, the complex-
ion of a minor case can change substantially when an investigator tells the 
prosecutor that the suspect has an extensive narcotics background. Such 
information is not normally included in the case file that is passed from the 
police to the prosecutor when charges are requested. 
 In addition, police input during plea bargain discussions is invaluable 
to prosecutors considering offers of cooperation from suspects or making 
recommendations for jail time or other penalties.185 
Because technology was inadequate at that time, the groups’ communication 
needs were perhaps best met by officers and prosecutors effectively becoming 
“partners in crime” to obtain convictions. Today, though, these justifications for 
what has become a grossly familiar prosecutor-officer relationship do not hold wa-
ter. The use of technology to share information is rampant and the communication 
problems of yesteryear are obsolete. Consequently, officers and prosecutors no 
longer need to be so intimately connected to keep each other up to speed with 
details of a criminal case. 
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B. Permeating Boundaries: Community Policing and Community Prosecution 
While collaboration to exchange information more efficiently was one justifi-
cation for the paradigm shift in the police-prosecutor relationship, there was an-
other, less innocuous, reason for the change. During the 1980s and early ’90s, police 
in cities around the country began implementing what they referred to as “commu-
nity policing” practices.186 Community policing involved “preventing crime and 
problem solving—not just arresting wrongdoers after the commission of a 
crime.”187 “Both in the local context, and as a development around the country that 
had gained significant national attention, community policing provided a model and 
in some cases put pressure on prosecutors.”188 One prosecutor described the pres-
sure he felt as a result of community policing: 
I felt instinctively that, as community policing was being implemented . . . 
if I didn’t change the way I did business…the community would draw closer 
to the police department. And the community and the police department, 
together, would come to despise my office...they would be pitted as a 
team against the brick wall that I represented. And they would, to the ex-
tent that they had failures…blame them on me, as the most visible propo-
nent of the criminal justice system.189 
This fear was likely rooted in the fact that most district attorneys and county 
prosecutors in America are “elected officials and political leaders, who can be 
blamed at the ballot box for a failure of leadership . . . .”190 Consequently, “the pros-
ecutor . . . emerge[s] frequently as the acknowledged leader in criminal justice.”191 
Thus, the community prosecution model emerged, not in an effort to reduce crime 
or obtain more convictions per se, but to stay in good graces with the public who 
favored police tactics under the community policing model.192 
Still, the community prosecution model effected an increased cooperation 
with police as well as an increase in convictions, because in this model, “the prose-
cutor assumes a leadership role in working closely with . . . other criminal justice 
agencies in the community[,]” and “boundaries demarcating the prosecutor’s office 
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from other justice, public/governmental and private agencies are increasingly per-
meated as they become partners.”193 Therefore, in addition to task forces, the con-
vergence of community policing and community prosecution during the late 1980s 
and early 1990s “produced not only changes in the activities of prosecutors them-
selves, but also a trend toward greater cooperation and collaboration between 
prosecutors and police.”194 
C. Police and Prosecutors—Partners in Crime 
Almost forty years after the beginning of the community prosecution move-
ment and the mission to fill in the cooperation gap, our current system is in a state 
opposite from that of the 1980s, but with no fewer negatives. While the ’80s argu-
ably saw more criminals go free as a result of a lack of communication between 
officers and prosecutors, the current generation is seeing a drastic increase in mis-
conduct as a result of the fraternal bond between the two agencies.195 Though the 
former goal of increasing convictions by bringing officers and prosecutors together 
has been realized across the nation, it has come at the enormous cost of increased 
distrust in the judicial system. As evidenced in the subsequent sections, the pendu-
lum has swung too far in the opposite direction. 
i. Testifying or Testilying? 
Some of the tactics used in police-prosecutor tag-teams are both insidious and 
elusive. One pervasive example is police perjury used to obtain a criminal conviction 
or to avoid charges being brought against an officer.196 Judges, prosecutors and po-
lice are in a unique position to detect and call-out false testimony. But instead of 
bringing indiscretions to light, these actors have condoned the use of lying on the 
stand to the detriment of criminal defendants, § 1983 plaintiffs, and society in gen-
eral. 
Police perjury “is so common and so accepted in some jurisdictions that the 
police themselves have come up with a name for it: ‘testilying.’”197 Testilying, as the 
phrase suggests, occurs when police lie under oath.198 “Even prosecutors—or at 
least former prosecutors—use terms like ‘routine,’ ‘commonplace,’ and ‘prevalent’ 
to describe the phenomenon.”199 Though police perjury is a “widely known” prob-
lem in the legal system, it is nearly impossible to define the scope and depth of it.200 
A government investigation of police misconduct in New York City discussed the 
inevitable link between police perjury and police misconduct.201 The study found 
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that “police falsification, . . . perhaps the most common form of police corruption,” 
was rampant in criminal prosecution cases.202 
The problem of police testilying is one involving the entire criminal justice sys-
tem, including judges who, for example, turn a blind eye on perjury to avoid having 
to suppress evidence when they think a defendant is guilty.203 In one study, defense 
attorneys, prosecutors, and judges estimated that officers lie on the stand in twenty 
to fifty percent of suppression hearings alone.204 In addition to suppression hear-
ings, “[p]olice perjury has become very common in [police] brutality cases, primarily 
because of the pressures an officer receives from his colleagues.”205 In sum, testi-
lying has become an epidemic in criminal cases. 
ii. Reportilying 
Another pervasive tactic that lends to unjust convictions is for officers to com-
mit “reportilying” to help the prosecution.206 Reportilying occurs when an officer 
knowingly falsifies a police report in an effort to increase the likelihood of a criminal 
conviction.207 Although officers allegedly commit testilying and reportilying more 
frequently when they believe the accused has actually committed a crime, 208 the 
deception still occurs even when they know that the accused has not committed a 
crime.209 “[P]olice lying intended to convict someone, whether thought to be guilty 
or innocent, . . . diminishes one of our most crucial ‘social goods’—trust in govern-
ment.”210 And “the exposure of police perjury damages the credibility of police tes-
timony.”211  
iii. Above the Law: Law Enforcement Prosecution, or Lack Thereof 
The phenomena of testilying and reportilying are a direct result of the police-
prosecutor brotherhood in America. The tag-team approach promotes police hav-
ing a dog-in-the-fight when it comes to prosecution. Instead of conducting an inde-
pendent investigation, testifying, and stepping out of the picture, police today are 
heavily invested in the outcomes of cases. In some instances, an officer and prose-
cutor work closely together for years trying to lock down a conviction.212 Conse-
quently, this approach fosters both prosecutor and police misconduct. Though 
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these close working relationships have “made possible a blend of police and prose-
cution skills in the pursuit of the same goals—making strong cases and convicting 
criminals[,]”213 they have also made possible great injustices. 
Because police work closely with prosecutors to investigate crimes and obtain 
convictions, they have the ability to bolster a case without detection by the other 
side. While this is clearly illegal, a prosecutor has little incentive to turn against an 
officer who lies under oath to help him obtain a conviction. Indeed, prosecutors 
have an enormous incentive to obtain perjured statements and keep the untruthful 
nature of such testimony under wraps. Nonetheless, even though it is well-known 
that some officers commit perjury to obtain convictions or to get themselves off the 
hook when they otherwise violate the law, neither the police nor the prosecutors—
both of whom are entrusted with enforcing the law)—attempt to end this practice. 
This problem is further exacerbated by police having absolute immunity in their ca-
pacity as witnesses. As previously discussed, absolute immunity means perjury will 
not subject them to liability in a § 1983 suit.214 
Additionally, prosecutors have broad discretionary power in deciding whom 
to charge, which presents a clear conflict of interest when local prosecutors handle 
cases against the police officers they work with on a daily basis.215 “[T]here is no 
group more closely linked to prosecutors than the officers they work with daily[,]” 
and local prosecutors have the job of prosecuting police officers who commit 
crimes.216 Thus, conflict-of-interest law plays a crucial role in the “now-popular con-
clusion that local prosecutors should not handle cases against police suspects.”217 
Yet, somehow, “scholars have paid little attention to the policies and practices of 
local district attorneys who are tasked with investigating and bringing charges 
against officers who commit crimes.”218 
Perhaps the most disconcerting facet of the police-prosecutor relationship, 
though, is that officers who kill people, even when unjustified, are often never 
brought to answer for their actions. And because prosecutors never have to, and 
rarely do, prosecute the officers they work with, there is no justice for victims in 
these circumstances. Indeed, both the criminal justice system and immunity to § 
1983 suits have failed these victims and their families. This conflict has been espe-
cially evident in the wake of the highly publicized killings of unarmed victims in re-
cent years where prosecutors refused to charge the police involved.219 And because 
prosecutors have absolute discretion in determining who to prosecute, and abso-
lute immunity protects them from a suit alleging that they have failed to do their 
job, there is no remedy available to these victims or their families when an officer 
effectively gets away with murder. 
These are dire issues that need to be addressed, and viable remedies do exist. 
Police can step back from prosecution of criminal defendants so as to lessen their 
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sense of investment in the prosecution, and special prosecutors can be appointed 
in cases where local prosecutors are tasked with potentially charging local officers. 
IV. PROPOSED REMEDIES FOR A BROKEN SYSTEM 
At the very core of the American judicial system lies courts’ duty to provide 
equal justice under the law and law enforcement’s duty to serve and protect. 
Providing special protections for judges, prosecutors, and police when they commit 
intentional, egregious acts that injure their fellow Americans is the antithesis of this 
foundation. While change can be daunting for the courts to embrace, even minor 
amendments to our system, such as altering the way we handle § 1983 litigation, 
can go a long way in attaining justice. Additionally, police and prosecutors must be 
held to the high standard that their positions entail. The following sections proffer 
three propositions for amending our current system with an eye toward the goal of 
obtaining justice under the law. 
A. Limit the Relationship between Prosecutors and Police 
Forty years ago, it was imperative for prosecutors and police to work closely 
together to efficiently exchange information and effectively prosecute criminal of-
fenders. Today, that is no longer the case. Technological advances make it entirely 
possible for law enforcement to exchange information almost instantaneously with-
out even seeing each other. This close-knit relationship that began several decades 
ago has morphed into one that promotes unlawful and unethical conduct. It also 
puts law enforcement in an awkward position when it comes to prosecuting the 
people they work so closely with. Limiting the close relationship between prosecu-
tors and officers will help stifle the insidious behavior that leads to unjust criminal 
convictions, and will promote convictions against law enforcement for unlawful acts 
and unwarranted constitutional deprivations. Loosening the bonds between police 
and prosecutors is a crucial step toward improving the justice system and holding 
law enforcement accountable for their wrongs. 
B. Appoint Special Prosecutors to Handle Criminal Prosecutions of Law 
Enforcement 
One of the bases for applying absolute immunity is that bad actors will be sub-
ject to answer for their misconduct in a criminal setting. But, as noted previously, 
prosecutors have unbridled discretion in determining whom to bring a criminal ac-
tion against, and they rarely prosecute each other or their police cohorts.220 This 
creates an enormous conflict of interest that has yet to be addressed. There is a 
simple fix to this problem, though, in that an independent prosecutor can be ap-
pointed to handle cases against law enforcement officers. And while the cost may 
be greater in terms of tax dollars, the value of bringing in unbiased parties to take 
on such matters is immeasurable when it comes to retaining community trust and 
ensuring justice for victims. In addition, appointing special prosecutors when 
                                                                
 220. See generally Levine, supra note 195. 
590 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 54 
  
charges need to be brought against police officers or prosecutors would further two 
important objectives: holding law enforcement accountable for their misdeeds, and 
diminishing the loss of faith in our justice system that has become especially prob-
lematic in recent years. 
C. Limit Immunity Doctrines to Exclude Malicious and Bad Faith Acts  
Courts cringe at the thought of adjudicating claims of malicious and bad faith 
acts because there is a purported risk that these kinds of suits will flood the dockets 
and put a heavy burden on state officials. But this concern for courts and state ac-
tors is misplaced. Instead, the courts should be focusing on the injured plaintiff in a 
§ 1983 action whose federal rights may have been willfully violated. Often, § 1983 
suits alleging malicious and bad faith acts entail atrocious behavior on behalf of a 
state actor. While the purpose of our justice system is to hold people accountable 
for their actions, immunity sends the message to state officials that they will not be 
held liable for even purposefully harmful conduct. 
Additionally, the fear of litigating unfounded claims in these instances can be 
set aside because complainants must allege facts that demonstrate a legitimate 
cause of action, and because, in any event, the court has to look into the actor’s 
conduct to determine if immunity applies. At that point, the court can determine if 
there is enough of a basis to go forward with the litigation. Thus, both absolute and 
qualified immunity can and should be limited to exclude malicious and bad faith 
acts. 
V. CONCLUSION 
“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individ-
ual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the 
first duties of government is to afford that protection.”221 The conflict of interest 
inherent in the police-prosecutor relationship and the application of immunity to 
even willful violations of individual rights are directly contrary to the essence of civil 
liberty in America. When there exist glaring, remediable problems such as 
these, the status quo must be altered. 
There are various mechanisms available to mend our current justice system: 
If we limit immunity doctrines to exclude malicious and bad faith acts so that law 
enforcement can be punished meaningfully for intentionally harming victims; if we 
impose requirements for a special prosecutor to take over criminal cases involving 
police and prosecutorial indiscretions; and if we limit the police-prosecutor rela-
tionship, we will take giant leaps toward a more just legal system. 
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